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ber of countries. Table 1 reports the average youth and 
prime-aged adult unemployment rate over the last ten years 
(2003-2012) in the EU27 and some selected member states. 
The average youth unemployment rate varies dramatically 
among member states, ranging from 7.3 per cent in the 
Netherlands to 30.7 per cent in Greece. However, this vari-
ation may partly reﬂ ect different general economic condi-
tions among member states. We therefore also report the 
youth unemployment rate relative to the prime-aged adult 
rate, both in proportional terms and in absolute percent-
age differences (see columns 3 and 4). This, however, does 
not change the global picture. Some countries (Belgium, 
France, Greece and Spain) always display higher structural 
youth unemployment than others.
Some features characterising the countries reported in Ta-
ble 1 suggest possible mechanisms explaining this divide. 
France, Greece and Spain are countries where employment 
protection is very high, while Denmark, the Netherlands and 
Austria are countries in which active labour market policies 
(ALMP) are known to be very effective. Furthermore, Ger-
many, Denmark and Austria have a well-developed dual ap-
prenticeship system. In this paper, we will explore the extent 
to which these elements play a role in explaining the high 
structural youth unemployment in Belgium.
In Belgium it is commonly believed that youth unemploy-
ment is essentially a problem in Wallonia and Brussels, but 
not so much in Flanders, the third Belgian region. We do 
not agree with this view.2 The youth unemployment rates in 
Brussels and Wallonia are indeed extremely high, reach-
ing 35 per cent and 30 per cent respectively, against only 
13 per cent in Flanders. However, no country or region in 
Table 1 displays a higher relative youth unemployment rate 
than Flanders. In terms of absolute differences, Flanders 
performs better but still considerably worse than the afore-
mentioned high-performing countries.
The high relative youth unemployment rate in Belgium re-
ﬂ ects predominantly a problem among low-skilled youth. 
Below the age of 25, the low educated are over-represented 
in the active population, since the highly educated are still 
studying at young ages, whereas the low educated have al-
ready entered the labour market. Between 2003 and 2012, 
the average unemployment rate of highly educated youth in 
Belgium was 12.7 per cent, lower than the EU27 average of 
2 See also B. Va n  d e r  L i n d e n : Un regard sur le rapport de l’OCDE: 
Des emplois pour les jeunes, in: Regards économiques, No. 56, 2007.
In late 2012, the European Commission raised the alarm 
about the evolution of the youth (under 25 years old) un-
employment rate since the start of the Great Recession in 
2008. The youth unemployment rate in the European Un-
ion (EU27) had attained an unprecedented height of 22.8 
per cent, which is 7.2 percentage points higher than four 
years earlier and more than twice as high as the prime-aged 
adult (25 to 54 years old) rate.1 The Commission therefore 
launched the Youth Guarantee in February of this year, an 
action worth €6 billion for the period 2014-2020 to help EU 
countries get young people into employment, further edu-
cation or (re)training within four months of leaving school. Is 
the call for urgency justiﬁ ed and is this action an adequate 
response?
It should be no surprise that the youth unemployment rate is 
higher and ﬂ uctuates more with the business cycle than the 
adult unemployment rate. First, it is higher because youths 
are at the start of their careers, a period in which they are 
typically searching for an adequate job match. This search 
process induces high job turnover, possibly with interven-
ing spells of unemployment. Second, in a downturn, em-
ployers will be reluctant to lose more experienced workers, 
since these have more ﬁ rm-speciﬁ c skills and greater re-
dundancy costs. So, the burden of adjustment typically falls 
on low-wage workers, such as the young.
The dramatic rise in the youth unemployment rate since 
2008 is therefore primarily a consequence of the profound 
economic crisis in the EU. If the Commission aims at bring-
ing the youth unemployment rate back down to the 2008 
level, it should follow a less restrictive ﬁ scal policy rather 
than investing in a Youth Guarantee. However, in view of the 
high public debts of many EU member states, a looser ﬁ s-
cal policy may be counterproductive, because it may result 
in lower private sector growth through the mechanism of 
expectations regarding the reimbursement of this debt and 
higher interest rates. Finding a way to counter the current 
crisis is therefore difﬁ cult.
Nevertheless, the fact that youth unemployment is cur-
rently high on the political agenda generates a window of 
opportunity for addressing structural problems in a num-
* I thank Stijn Baert, Yves Saks and Bruno Van der Linden for com-
ments on a ﬁ rst draft of this paper.
1 See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/employment_
unemployment_lfs/introduction.
Bart Cockx*
Youth Unemployment in Belgium: Diagnosis and Key Remedies
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
203
Forum
youth are on average employed for only three years. This is 
well below the OECD average of about 3.5 years. However, 
the low educated are only expected to spend slightly more 
than one year in employment during their ﬁ rst ﬁ ve years af-
ter leaving school. No other country displayed in Figure 1 
performs as poorly as Belgium.
In Belgium migrant youths are also much more affected 
than in other European countries. Baert and Cockx and 
Baert et al. analyse this problem in detail and show that dis-
crimination is an important explanatory factor.3 However, for 
lack of space, we do not discuss the speciﬁ c problems of 
migrant youth in this contribution.
In this contribution, we aim at getting a better understand-
ing of the drivers of structural youth unemployment in Bel-
gium and propose key remedies based on recent academic 
research. Furthermore, we discuss the importance of the 
three aforementioned factors: employment protection, edu-
cation, and the design of passive and active labour market 
policies.
Employment protection
In Belgium employees are protected by a minimum wage 
and by extensive employment protection legislation 
(EPL). We argue that strict EPL decreases the speed of 
the school-to-work transition for the high skilled, but not 
3 S. B a e r t , B. C o c k x : Pure Ethnic Gaps in Educational Attainment 
and School to Work Transitions. When Do They Arise?, Ghent Univer-
sity Working Paper, No. 2013/832, 2013; and S. B a e r t , B. C o c k x , 
N. G h e y l e ,  C. Va n d a m m e : Do Employers Discriminate Less if Va-
cancies are Difﬁ cult to Fill? Evidence from a Field Experiment, Ghent 
University Working Paper, No. 2013/830, 2013.
14.2 per cent. By contrast, the corresponding rate for youth 
without a secondary school diploma was 30.4 per cent in 
Belgium against 23.8 per cent in the EU27.
Figure 1 provides further evidence that the school-to-work 
transition is especially problematic for the low educated 
in Belgium. In the ﬁ rst ﬁ ve years after graduating, Belgian 
Table 1
Youth and prime-aged adult unemployment rates in 
selected EU countries, 10-year average (2003-2012)
S o u rc e : Eurostat.
Country/
region
(1)
Youth 
(< 25 years) 
unemploy-
ment rate
(2)
Prime-aged 
adult
(25-54 years) 
unemploy-
ment rate
(3)
Ratio:
(1)/(2)
(4)
Absolute 
difference, 
in percent-
age points:
(1)-(2)
Greece 30.7% 11.1% 2.8 19.6
Spain 30.4% 13.2% 2.3 17.2
France 20.9% 7.7% 2.7 13.2
Belgium 19.8% 6.8% 2.9 13.0
Brussels 35.0% 15.8% 2.2 19.1
Wallonia 29.6% 9.6% 3.1 20.1
Flanders 13.5% 4.0% 3.3 9.4
EU27 18.9% 7.9% 2.4 11.0
Germany 11.4% 7.9% 1.4 6.5
Denmark 10.4% 4.8% 2.2 5.6
Austria 9.0% 4.0% 2.2 5.0
Netherlands 7.3% 3.4% 2.1 3.9
Figure 1
Expected number of years spent in employment during the ﬁ ve years after school, 2008
1 Less than upper secondary education.  2 Data refer to 2006 for Australia.
S o u rc e : J. H ø j : Enhancing the Inclusiveness of the Labour Market in Belgium, in: OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1009, 2013, OECD 
Publishing, p. 16.
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EPL for temporary employment
The stricter the EPL is for open-ended contracts, the more 
employers tend to use temporary contracts as a selection 
device before making open-ended contracts available and 
as a way to manage ﬂ uctuations in product demand. This 
risks segmenting the labour market into a primary seg-
ment of long-term employment and a secondary segment 
in which workers transit from one short-term dead-end job 
to another, possibly with some intervening spells of unem-
ployment.
In Belgium temporary contracts seem to be used less com-
monly than in other European countries (see Figure 2). Only 
about 30 per cent of the employed youth are employed 
in temporary contracts. This is considerably lower than 
the 40 per cent European average. Moreover, in Belgium 
this share is nearly ﬁ ve times that of prime-aged workers 
(among the highest in the OECD), meaning that in Belgium 
temporary employment is even less widespread among 
prime-aged workers than among youth.
The aforementioned relatively weak protection for blue-
collar workers in open-ended contracts – together with 
the very strict EPL in ﬁ xed-term contracts for all types of 
workers – explains the relatively limited use of temporary 
contracts in Belgium. In addition, employers of blue-collar 
workers can make use of the very ﬂ exible system of tem-
so much for the low skilled. The employment of the latter 
group is more affected by the very high minimum wage in 
Belgium.
EPL for regular employment
Scientiﬁ c studies consistently conclude that the overall 
impact of EPL on aggregate unemployment rates is weak 
with an ambiguous sign and that the effect on employment 
is negative but modest.4 The main explanation for this is 
that strict EPL has two opposite effects. On the one hand, 
it tends to reduce the job separation rate, i.e. the rate at 
which workers transit from employment to unemployment. 
On the other hand, strict EPL decreases the exit rate from 
unemployment into work, since ﬁ rms, anticipating future 
costs on labour force adjustment, become more cautious 
about hiring. These effects may, in principle, offset each 
other. However, there is ample evidence that stringent 
EPL tends to worsen the employment prospects of those 
groups that are most subject to problems of (re-)entry into 
the labour market, such as young people, women and the 
long-term unemployed.
EPL for regular employment contracts is less strict in Bel-
gium than on average in the OECD and only slightly stricter 
than in Denmark, which is known for its relatively ﬂ exible 
system.5 However, the OECD indicator of employment pro-
tection conceals considerable heterogeneity in strictness 
in Belgium, especially according to the type of labour con-
tract. In Belgium EPL for open-ended contracts differs be-
tween blue- and white-collar workers. For the latter group, 
it differs between those earning more than €32,254 a year 
and those earning less. The notice period for a blue-collar 
worker is generally less than one month for each ﬁ ve years 
of seniority, while for low-wage and high-wage white-collar 
workers it is three and ﬁ ve months respectively. This means 
that in Belgium EPL for high-wage white-collar workers is 
probably among the strictest in the OECD, while the re-
verse holds for blue-collar workers.
To the extent that white-collar workers are more educated 
than blue-collar workers, we conclude that in Belgium the 
strictness of EPL in regular open-ended contracts is es-
pecially a barrier for the highly educated youth. For low-
educated youth, EPL strictness is less of an issue and, as 
discussed below, other factors are more important.
4 For a review, see e.g. European Commission: Flexibility and security 
in the EU labour markets, Employment in Europe 2006, 2006, pp. 75-
118.
5 Measured in 2008, see http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=10179.
Figure 2
Incidence of temporary employment (ﬁ xed-term 
contract, temporary help) in youth employment, 2011
S o u rc e : P. C a h u c , S. C a rc i l l o , K.F. Z i m m e r m a n n : L’emploi des 
jeunes peu qualiﬁ é en France, in: Les notes du conseil d’analyse économ-
ique, No. 4, 2013, pp. 1-12, here p. 10.
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Policy implications
Since EPL in Belgium is only strict for white-collar work-
ers, it may mainly hamper the school-to-work transitions of 
highly educated youth. This discrimination in EPL against 
blue-collar workers is currently the subject of much con-
troversy and debate. It is clear that the discrimination must 
eventually disappear and that the level of strictness will 
converge. This may facilitate the school-to-work transi-
tion for the highly educated but risks impeding that of the 
low educated. We argue that in order to avoid this negative 
side effect, the harmonisation of EPL should be paired with 
a more structural reform of EPL that uses available funds 
more efﬁ ciently, stimulating re-employment rather than in-
activity. In a nutshell, we propose pooling the bulk of insur-
ance payments in an insurance fund and using it partially to 
ﬁ nance the activation of redundant workers.10
For the labour market integration of low-skilled youth, the 
high minimum wage is a major problem in Belgium, since it 
raises the wage costs above productivity, making it unprof-
itable for employers to hire this group. Moreover, this prob-
lem has been exacerbated by the recent agreement by the 
social partners to abolish by 1 January 2015 the phasing 
10 For more details, see B. C o c k x , B. Va n  d e r  L i n d e n : Flexicurity 
in Belgium. A reform proposal based on economic principles, in: In-
ternational Labour Review, Vol. 149, No. 3, 2010, pp. 361-372; and B. 
C o c k x , Va n  d e r  L i n d e n : Quelle protection de l’emploi en Bel-
gique?, Regards économiques, Focus, 19 April 2013.
porary unemployment to manage ﬂ uctuations in product 
demand.6 Nevertheless, these arguments are less applica-
ble to high-skilled, white-collar workers. The risk of getting 
trapped in temporary jobs is therefore still present for this 
group.
The ﬁ ndings of Cockx and Picchio further reinforce this 
view.7 Based on a sample of more than 15,000 long-term 
unemployed school-leavers in Belgium, these researchers 
ﬁ nd that the majority of short-lived jobs are not dead ends 
but stepping stones to long-lasting jobs. By accepting a 
job that lasts at most one quarter instead of continuing job 
search for a longer-lasting job, the probability of entering 
a long-lasting job within two years increases by 13.4 per-
centage points for men and by 9.5 percentage points for 
women. Nevertheless, this conclusion should be regarded 
with caution, since this effect displays substantial hetero-
geneity. Among those entering short-lived jobs, 40 per cent 
actually have less chance of entering a long-lasting job. 
Moreover, in line with expectations, the stepping-stone ef-
fect is weaker among the highly educated.
Minimum wage and wage cost
As mentioned above, the transition from school to work for 
low-educated youth in Belgium is extremely troublesome, 
but strict EPL is not the main driver of this. High minimum 
wages are more to blame. There is increasing agreement 
among researchers that minimum wages have a very 
harmful impact on the employment of low-skilled youth.8
Figure 3 shows that among OECD countries in which a 
minimum wage is in force, the cost of employing a 20-year-
old in Belgium is among the highest. More over, this ﬁ gure 
underestimates the genuine level of wage costs, since it 
is based on the legal minimum wage. In Belgium a higher 
minimum wage is negotiated in most sectors. Kampelmann 
and Rycx report that in 2007 the employment-weighted av-
erage of the minimum wages was 17 per cent higher than 
the legal minimum wage.9
6 J.J. H ø j : Enhancing the Inclusiveness of the Labour Market in Bel-
gium, in: OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1009, 
2013, OECD Publishing. Between 2009 and 2011, a comparable sys-
tem for white-collar workers was temporarily introduced.
7 B. C o c k x , M. P i c c h i o : Are Short-Lived Jobs Stepping Stones to 
Long-Lasting Jobs?, in: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 
Vol. 74, No. 5, 2012, pp. 646-675.
8 See e.g. F. K r a m a r z , T. P h i l i p p o n : The Impact of Differential Pay-
roll Tax Subsidies on Minimum Wage Employment, in: Journal of Pub-
lic Economics, Vol. 82, No. 1, 2001, pp. 115-146; and D. N e u m a r k , 
W. Wa s c h e r : Minimum Wages, Massachusetts 2008, MIT Press.
9 S. K a m p e l m a n n , F. R y c x : Who Earns Minimum Wages in Europe? 
New Evidence Based on Household Surveys, DULBEA Working Pa-
per, No. 13-01.RS, Brussels 2013, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Ta-
ble 3.
Figure 3
Hourly wage cost of a 20-year-old employee working 
at the minimum wage in OECD countries in which a 
minimum wage is in force, 2010
S o u rc e : P. C a h u c , S. C a rc i l l o , K.F. Z i m m e r m a n n : L’emploi des 
jeunes peu qualiﬁ é en France, in: Les notes du conseil d’analyse économ-
ique, No. 4, 2013, pp. 1-12, here p. 9.
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pares directly for a profession and the two other streams 
have mixed objectives. The streaming system has a very 
(implicit) hierarchical ordering and contains a large number 
of sub-streams. The hierarchical ordering has been labelled 
the “cascade-system”, since many pupils starting off in the 
“higher” streams are gradually forced down the cascade by 
a system of reorientation at the end of each school year. A 
consequence is that pupils do not end up in technical and 
vocational streams as a deliberate choice, but rather as an 
outcome of a forced reorientation after failure in a “higher” 
stream. Technical and vocational streams therefore attract 
more low-ability and discouraged pupils, which is detri-
mental to their image.
Another important common feature is the use of retention 
as a policy of remediation. This policy is used much more 
often than in other countries. In the OECD, 13 per cent of 
15-year-olds have repeated at least one year, while this ﬁ g-
ure was 30 per cent for Belgium.19
Finally, combining work with studies is very uncommon in 
Belgium. Students in the vocational stream can switch to 
part-time education from 16 years onwards, but in 2008 only 
three per cent of youth aged 15-29 combined studies with 
working, while this share was 12 per cent in the EU15. More-
over, part-time students have many difﬁ culties in ﬁ nding em-
ployment, since ﬁ rms are reluctant to offer employment to 
these students due to the aforementioned negative image.
Policy recommendations
Most scientiﬁ c evidence indicates that grade repetition 
signiﬁ cantly worsens performance on various measures 
of academic achievement.20 Similarly, even if scientiﬁ c 
research is inconclusive regarding the average level of 
achievement, there is ﬁ rm evidence that early streaming 
has negative effects on the performance of pupils with 
disadvantaged family backgrounds.21 Numerous stud-
ies have shown that the transition from school to work 
is greatly facilitated by an apprenticeship system that 
guarantees high quality work-based learning.22 How-
ever, international experiences show that schemes can 
only be implemented successfully if there is signiﬁ cant 
19 Ibid, p. 49.
20 G. S c h w e rd t , M.R. We s t : The Effects of Test-based Retention on 
Student Outcomes over Time: Regression Discontinuity Evidence 
from Florida, IZA Discussion Paper Series, No. 7314, 2013.
21 M. P i o p i u n i k : The Effects of Early Tracking on Student Perfor-
mance: Evidence from a School Reform in Bavaria, Ifo Working Paper, 
No. 153, 2013.
22 C. B i a v a s c h i , W. E i c h h o r s t , C. G u i l i e t t i , M.J. K e n d z i a , A. 
M u r a v y e v, J. P i e t e r s , N. R o d r í g u e z - P l a n a s , R. S c h m i d l , 
K.F. Z i m m e r m a n n : Youth Unemployment and Vocational Training, 
IZA Discussion Paper Series, No. 6890, 2012.
in of the minimum wage by age.11 This means that the full 
minimum wage will apply to young employees under 21, 
dramatically increasing their wage costs. We strongly plead 
for reconsidering this measure. Moreover, in view of the in-
ternationally high minimum wage level in Belgium, this will 
not be sufﬁ cient. Either the minimum wage should be fur-
ther reduced or, if this is not socially acceptable, low wages 
should be structurally reduced. Numerous studies have 
shown that reducing labour costs creates more employ-
ment, even more so when the reduction is targeted at low 
wages close to the minimum wage.12 Following Dejemeppe 
and Van der Linden,13 these targeted wage cost reductions 
can be ﬁ nanced by abolishing the majority of the targeted 
recruitment subsidies. In addition, rather than reinforcing 
across-the-board reductions in labour costs – as is often 
proposed in the public debate as a remedy for the low em-
ployment rates in Belgium – these should rather be target-
ed at low wages. This is because across-the-board wage 
reductions are largely absorbed by higher (bargained) net 
wages,14 therefore inducing hardly any employment growth.
The educational system
In Belgium the educational system is organised accord-
ing to the different language Communities, i.e. the Flemish 
and the French.15 Nevertheless, the educational systems in 
these Communities share a number of common features. 
Compulsory schooling starts at age six and ends at 18,16 
later than in most OECD countries.17 Streaming occurs at 
the beginning of secondary school, generally at the age of 
12. This is relatively early from an international perspec-
tive. The median age at which pupils in OECD countries are 
streamed is 15 years.18
Pupils are divided into four major streams: general, tech-
nical, vocational and arts. The general stream prepares 
explicitly for higher education, the vocational stream pre-
11 Currently, the reduced rate is 70 per cent for those under 17, gradually 
increasing to 100 per cent by the age of 21.
12 B. C o c k x , H. S n e e s s e n s , B. Va n  d e r  L i n d e n : Evaluation mi-
cro et macroéconomique des allégements de la (para)ﬁ scalité en 
Belgique, Gent 2005, Academia Press. P. C a h u c , S. C a rc i l l o , K.F. 
Z i m m e r m a n n : L’emploi des jeunes peu qualiﬁ é en France, in: Les 
notes du conseil d’analyse économique, No. 4, 2013, pp. 1-12.
13 M. D e j e m e p p e , B. Va n  d e r  L i n d e n : Les soutiens ﬁ nanciers à la 
création d’emploi, Etude pour la Maison des Entreprises wallonnes 
ASBL, IRES, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve 
2013.
14 Ibid.
15 We ignore the small German Community.
16 From 15 years onwards, only part-time education (alternating with 
work) is compulsory, but this concerns very few pupils.
17 In most OECD countries compulsory education ends at age 16; see 
OECD: Equity and Quality in Education. Supporting Disadvantaged 
Pupils and Schools, Paris 2012, OECD Publishing, p. 83.
18 Ibid, p. 56.
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Unemployment beneﬁ ts and active labour market 
policy
Unemployment beneﬁ ts and job search requirements
In contrast to many other countries, in Belgium school-leav-
ers are entitled to unemployment beneﬁ ts (UB) even if they 
have no work experience. However, the entitlement starts 
only after an “integration period” of one year (as of 2012; 
it was previously nine months). During this period, needy 
youth are entitled to a means-tested welfare allowance paid 
out at the municipal level conditional on signing an “integra-
tion contract”. The UB level depends on the age and the 
household situation of the youth. For youth older than 18, the 
UB monthly level currently varies between €417 and €1,084 
for cohabitants without and with dependents respectively. 
Since young people often continue to live with their parents, 
the lower level applies in most cases. Before 2012 individu-
als were entitled to these UB for an indeﬁ nite period. Since 
January 2012, cohabitants are only entitled to UB for a maxi-
mum period of three years. For other school-leavers, this 
time limit of three years begins to apply at the age of 30.
Since 2004 the job search of UB recipients is monitored, and 
sanctions apply in case of non-compliance. Beneﬁ t sanc-
tions are much harsher than elsewhere, but the frequency of 
the monitoring is very low compared to international stand-
ards. For those under (over) 25, job search effort is not eval-
uated before the 15th (21st) month of unemployment, and 
if the requirements are satisﬁ ed, the next evaluation takes 
place 12 or 14 months later. This contrasts starkly with the 
median monitoring frequency of one month in OECD coun-
tries.25 The Belgian programme has been rigorously evaluat-
ed and shown to signiﬁ cantly stimulate the transition to work 
and to be cost effective.26
Since August 2012, the government has intensiﬁ ed its moni-
toring of the job search activity of school-leavers. Beginning 
with the start of the entitlement, job search effort is moni-
tored every six months. In April 2013, the minister of employ-
ment also announced that the job search effort of school-
leavers starting unemployment spells in the academic year 
2012-2013 will be monitored already in the seventh and 11th 
months of the integration period. In case of a negative evalu-
ation, school-leavers will be entitled to UB only six month 
later if at that moment they satisfy the job search require-
ments.
25 OECD: Activating the Unemployed: What Do Countries Do, in: Em-
ployment Outlook, 2007, pp. 207-242.
26 B. C o c k x , M. D e j e m e p p e , B. Va n  d e r  L i n d e n : Evaluation de 
l’activation du comportement de recherche d’emploi, Gent 2011, 
Academia Press; and B. C o c k x , M. D e j e m e p p e : Monitoring job 
search effort: an evaluation based on a regression discontinuity de-
sign, in: Labour Economics, Vol. 19, No. 5, 2012, pp. 729-737.
institutional support and acceptance by major actors. 
Employers should be fully integrated in the design and 
implementation of such schemes to guarantee that train-
ing curricula are up to date and in line with future needs. 
Moreover, a system of certiﬁ cation of competences has 
to be elaborated to ensure that young workers’ com-
petences are also valued in ﬁ rms other than the one in 
which these competences were acquired.
Since grade repetition, early streaming and deﬁ ciencies 
in work-based learning are characteristic features of 
the educational systems in both the Flemish and French 
Communities, educational reform should have similar 
characteristics in both of them. We summarise the main 
ingredients of such schooling reform brieﬂ y:
1. Address grade repetition by continuous remediation 
during the school year and by supporting teachers to 
teach classes with more diverse attainment levels;
2. Postpone streaming in secondary schools;
3. Stimulate work-based learning by explicitly integrating 
the social partners as actors in the labour market in 
the design of the schooling reform. Elaborate a system 
of certiﬁ cation of work-placed learning so that skills 
learnt in one ﬁ rm can be valued in another.
This list of key remedies is in line with the recent policy 
advice of the OECD.23 In Flanders the aforementioned 
policy recommendations were the basis of a school re-
form proposed recently endorsed by the Flemish gov-
ernment, with ofﬁ cial implementation planned for 2016. 
However, the persistent opposition by Flanders’ major 
political party has made it uncertain whether and in which 
form this plan will be eventually enacted. Moreover, the 
current version of the plan allows schools to opt out. On 
the other hand, major actors in the ﬁ eld favour the reform. 
In addition, schools will be ﬁ nancially rewarded if they 
follow the guidelines of the reform. Proponents therefore 
claim that it will be difﬁ cult to block this reform. Despite 
the less favourable performance of the educational sys-
tem, reforms undertaken in the French Community are 
more piecemeal than in Flanders. The most notable is the 
system of certiﬁ cation and employer integration in the 
design of vocational education.24 It is urgent to undertake 
a more global structural reform.
23 See OECD, op. cit.; and OECD: Action Plan for Youth, Paris 2013, 
OECD Publishing.
24 See http://www.cpu.cfwb.be/.
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ance. Academic research has shown that only early, endur-
ing and intensive remedial education and guided work expe-
rience helps this target group.29 In addition, the counselling 
by the regional PES should be more targeted at this group 
instead of aiming at reaching all youth early in the unemploy-
ment spell.
Early UB entitlement, more frequent monitoring, lower sanc-
tions
We propose to pay to school-leavers relatively low (of the 
order of €400) ﬂ at-rate UB early after the start of their un-
employment spell. For those in need, this ﬂ at-rate UB could 
be topped up by a means-tested welfare allowance. Job 
search effort would be monitored on the basis of written re-
ports to be handed in on a monthly basis. A random sam-
ple of these monthly reports would be thoroughly checked. 
In case of non-compliance, an invitation should follow to 
draw up an action plan with clearly deﬁ ned goals. This ac-
tion plan should be tailored to the proﬁ le and needs of the 
job seeker. For high-skilled job seekers, it would typically 
consist of clearly deﬁ ned job search requirements evalu-
ated in an interview after one month. For other job seekers, it 
would consist of participation in some action such as train-
ing, counselling and job-search assistance. Compliance 
with this action plan should be closely monitored. In case of 
non-compliance, sanctions should be more moderate than 
the current sanctions, but progressive in case of recidivism. 
To the extent that job search effort and active participation 
in actions are closely monitored, beneﬁ ts need not run out. 
However, entitlement to a higher level of UB requires a mini-
mal employment record.
Entitling UB close to the start of the unemployment spell 
goes against current policy of lengthening the “integra-
tion period”. We justify this as follows. First, paying a non-
means-tested allowance early in the unemployment spell 
provides incentives for disadvantaged youth to register as 
job seekers. This makes early intervention possible, a cru-
cial condition for success.30 Second, up-front beneﬁ ts and a 
time limit increase the job-search incentives with unemploy-
ment duration, countering the discouragement of long-term 
unemployment. By contrast, during the current “integration 
period”, this discouragement is reinforced, since search in-
centives decrease as one approaches the moment at which 
UB entitlement starts.
Youth must be made aware that the payment of this non-
means-tested UB imposes costs on society and therefore 
29 P.Z. S c h o c h e t , J. B u rg h a rd t , S. M c C o n n e l l : Does Job Corps 
Work? Impact Findings from the National Job Corps Study, in: Ameri-
can Economic Review, Vol. 98, No. 5, 2008, pp. 1864-1886.
30 Recently, P. C a h u c  et al., op. cit.; and OECD, 2013, op. cit. pleaded 
for similar schemes.
Active labour market policies
In Belgium UB and the associated job search monitoring 
scheme are organised at the national level, while ALMP are 
the competence of regional authorities. Part of the ALMP 
(e.g. the recruitment subsidies) is, however, still in the pro-
cess of being transferred from the national level.
Following the recommendations of the EU, in all three re-
gions (Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia), the regional Pub-
lic Employment Service (PES) currently contacts the young 
unemployed very early in the unemployment spell: youths 
aged below 25 are contacted beginning one month after 
registration, and by the fourth month all unemployed youths 
should have been invited to a meeting with a counsellor. If 
they lack the empowerment to ﬁ nd a job by themselves, 
an action plan is drawn up and training, counselling or job 
search assistance is tailored to their needs.
In January 2013, a nationally coordinated action plan rein-
forced at the regional level was launched. This plan targets 
school drop-outs and graduates with at most a secondary 
education diploma, groups facing acute difﬁ culties in the 
school-to-work transition (see Figure 1). It aims at offering 
more workplace-based learning opportunities. Speciﬁ cally, 
these school-leavers are offered full-time apprenticeships of 
three to six months. Participants are entitled to a daily allow-
ance (€27) paid out by the federal unemployment agency. 
The employer pays a monthly compensation of €200.
Finally, the federal government activates the unemployed via 
targeted recruitment subsidies to employers27 and a wage 
bonus28 to low-wage workers. The current agreement stipu-
lates that the budget of the targeted recruitment subsidies 
be transferred to the regions. This is a window of opportu-
nity for reform.
Policy recommendations
As mentioned above, youth unemployment in Belgium is es-
sentially a problem of the labour market integration of low-
educated school-leavers. We therefore mainly propose re-
forms that target this group.
More intensive guidance for school drop-outs
First, the recently launched action plan providing appren-
ticeships for low-educated youth is a step in the right direc-
tion, but it should be reinforced with more intensive guid-
27 These subsidies are the sum of the “targeted” reductions in the em-
ployer’s social security contributions and a subsidy from the federal 
unemployment agency (ACTIVA).
28 This takes the form of a reduction of the employee’s social security 
contributions.
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justiﬁ cation.32 Cockx and Picchio ﬁ nd evidence that the 
lower employability of the long-term unemployed is not so 
much a consequence of human capital depreciation, but 
more a consequence of the negative signal this duration 
conveys to recruiters.33 In this case, the subsidy aims at 
compensating for the additional selection costs borne dur-
ing the probation period when hiring long-term unemployed 
workers.
Conclusion
In Belgium structural youth unemployment is higher than 
in many other European countries. The problem is particu-
larly severe for low-educated youth. A high minimum wage, 
a strict separation between school and work and a verti-
cally segmented schooling system with high retention rates 
and too early streaming have been identiﬁ ed as key causal 
factors. Strict employment protection legislation focuses 
only on high-skilled youth. A reduction of the labour costs 
of low-wage workers and a fundamental schooling reform 
that aims at dismantling the strict barrier between school 
and work are proposed as key remedies. In addition, rather 
than aiming at reaching all youth early in the unemployment 
spell, ALMP should assign more resources to very intensive 
remedial education and guided work experience support-
ing very low-educated youth. Finally, entitling youth to low 
UB based on the principle of “mutual obligation”, coupled 
with very intensive and durable guidance targeted at disad-
vantaged youth, is to be preferred over a strategy in which 
youth are not (or only late in the unemployment spell) enti-
tled to UB.
32 Ibid.
33 B. C o c k x , M. P i c c h i o : Scarring effects of remaining unemployed 
for long-term unemployed school-leavers, in: The Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society), forthcoming.
requires effort aimed at minimising these costs. For that 
reason, we propose to sharply intensify job search moni-
toring. This can be realised with relatively limited means if 
the ﬁ rst screening is based on written proofs. However, cor-
rectly measuring search intensity is difﬁ cult. To compensate 
for measurement error, the sanction level should be mod-
est and other more easily measurable actions should be in-
volved in the evaluation of the effort exerted.
Replacement of recruitment subsidies by a low-wage sub-
sidy, except for the long-term unemployed
Currently, recruitment subsidies targeted at low-skilled and 
long-term unemployed youth are granted for a limited time 
period after recruitment. This time limit is justiﬁ ed by the 
gradual productivity growth with tenure. This productivity 
growth is, however, very heterogeneous, and it may be very 
low among the low-skilled.31 It is therefore unlikely that it ex-
actly matches the decreasing proﬁ le of the subsidy and thus 
risks inducing a waste of resources. The wage evolution 
should, however, more or less match that of productivity. In 
a subsidy scheme targeted at low wages, the subsidy tapers 
off with the wage. The decline will therefore be much more 
in line with productivity growth than any recruitment subsidy 
scheme. We therefore propose to replace the recruitment 
subsidies targeted to low-educated youth by a permanent 
low-wage subsidy. Such a scheme also avoids the turnover 
induced by temporary subsidies and the possible substitu-
tion with older workers if the recruitment subsidy is targeted 
at youth.
For the recruitment of the long-term unemployed, the tem-
porary nature of the recruitment subsidy may have another 
31 B. C o c k x , C. G o e b e l , B. Va n  d e r  L i n d e n : Politiques d’activation 
pour des jeunes chômeurs de longue durée sans expérience de tra-
vail, Gent 2004, Academia Press.
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Spanish Youth Unemployment: Déjà Vu
Up to 2007, youth employment rates in Spain rose steadily 
for more than a decade, and the Spanish economy appeared 
to be on its way to bridge a persistent gap with the leading 
economies of Europe. However, since the onset of the Great 
Recession, this favourable trend has reversed. The employ-
ment rate for the age group 16-24 has dropped by more than 
27 percentage points, from a peak of 45.2 per cent in 2007 to 
a trough of 17.6 per cent in 2013, thereby eliminating all of the 
gains achieved during the preceding long expansion.
Over the same period, the youth unemployment rate has al-
most tripled. While this rate bottomed out at about 20 per 
cent in 2007, it now stands at a record level of 57.2 per cent. 
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